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Quantum entropic security and approximate
quantum encryption
Simon Pierre Desrosiers and Fre´de´ric Dupuis
Abstract—An encryption scheme is said to be entropically secure
if an adversary whose min-entropy on the message is upper
bounded cannot guess any function of the message. Similarly,
an encryption scheme is entropically indistinguishable if the
encrypted version of a message whose min-entropy is high
enough is statistically indistinguishable from a fixed distribution.
We present full generalizations of these two concepts to the
encryption of quantum states in which the quantum conditional
min-entropy, as introduced by Renner, is used to bound the
adversary’s prior information on the message. A proof of the
equivalence between quantum entropic security and quantum
entropic indistinguishability is presented. We also provide proofs
of security for two different ciphers in this model and a proof
for a lower bound on the key length required by any such
cipher. These ciphers generalize existing schemes for approximate
quantum encryption to the entropic security model.
Index Terms—quantum information, cryptography, entropic se-
curity
I. INTRODUCTION
SEMANTIC security, whether it is computational, as intro-duced in [1], information theoretic in a classical setting,
as introduced in [2] and [3], or information theoretic in
a limited quantum setting, as introduced in [4], contrasts
the capabilities of two adversaries: one (A) that has access
to an encrypted version of the message, and another (A′)
that does not. Their abilities to predict a function on the
initial message are compared. Of course A′ seems to be at a
tremendous disadvantage: it has access to nothing but the prior
distribution of the plain text, whereas A also has access to an
encrypted version of the plain text and could potentially use
imperfections in the encryption scheme to gain an advantage.
However, this can become a way to bound these imperfections:
an encryption scheme is considered semantically secure if,
for every adversary A, there exists an A′ that can predict
every function on the plaintext almost as well as A without
even having access to the encrypted message. This is a very
strong security criterion, especially in the information theoretic
setting.
Perhaps surprisingly, it is possible to construct semantically
secure encryption schemes which, depending on their setting,
make very few assumptions on A and yet do not require keys
to be as long as the message. In the computational setting,
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Goldwasser and Micali [1] had as a constraint that both A
and A′ were probabilistic polynomial-time machines. In their
model, they could construct encryption schemes which, on all
message distributions, would render A as useless as A′. In
the information theoretic setting, introduced by Russell and
Wang [2] and expanded upon by Dodis and Smith [3], no
computational limitation is imposed on A or A′. In order to
achieve significant key size reduction, a limit on the prior
knowledge of A on the plain text space is assumed. In fact,
a lower bound on the min-entropy of the message space is
assumed: the most probable message is not too probable.
For this reason, this concept is called entropic security in
the context of information-theoretic security. In the quantum
information theoretic setting, as introduced by Desrosiers [4],
the exact same restriction on the min-entropy is imposed on A,
except that this time messages are quantum states which are
further assumed to be unentangled with any quantum system
that the adversary might possess. If these two restrictions
are satisfied, one can construct encryption schemes for the
quantum setting which have exactly the same key size as in the
classical setting: for an n-qubit message which is assumed to
have a min-entropy of at least t, then we need n−t+log(1/ε)
bits of key to encrypt it securely (where ε is a security
parameter).
In this paper we remove one of those two restrictions. Of
course, the limit on the min-entropy of the adversary on
the message space is hard to remove: it is the essence of
entropic security. However, it has to be modified in order to get
robust definitions of security in the presence of entanglement
between the sender and the adversary. The notion of quantum
conditional min-entropy as introduced by Renner in [5] will
be used to bound the prior “knowledge” of the adversary.
This new notion of min-entropy allows us to remove the no-
entanglement restriction and replace it by something more
general. Indeed, if a state is not entangled, we have an
implicit lower bound of zero on the conditional min-entropy,
whereas in the general case, the conditional min-entropy of
the adversary on an n-qubit system held by the sender ranges
between −n and n. It turns out that the key size remains the
same in this model: for an n-qubit message about which the
eavesdropper has a min-entropy of at least t, we still need
a key of n − t + log(1/ε) bits. In the extreme case where
we have no bound at all on the min-entropy, this reduces to
2n+ log(1/ε), which is in total agreement with the standard
result of Ambainis, Mosca, Tapp and de Wolf [6].
Note that this generalizes the existing literature on approx-
2imate quantum encryption. In [7], Hayden, Leung, Shor
and Winter considered the task of approximately encrypting
quantum states assuming that the adversary is not entangled
with the sender. They showed, using a randomized argument,
that, while we need 2n bits of key to perfectly encrypt an
n-qubit quantum message, there exists a scheme requiring
n+logn+2 log(1/ε)+O(1) bits of key. Ambainis and Smith
[8] then gave two explicit constructions of an approximate
quantum encryption scheme under the same assumption re-
quiring n+2 logn+2 log(1/ε) and n+2 log(1/ε) bits of key
respectively. Here we recover and generalize these results.
More recently, Fehr and Schaffner [9] gave a classical encryp-
tion scheme which is entropically secure against an adversary
that has access to quantum information about the classical
message. Our work also generalizes this result: when our
encryption schemes are applied to a classical message, the
resulting ciphertext remains classical, and the proof of security
still works against quantum adversaries.
We introduce our model and definitions in section III and show
in section IV that the two security definitions we give are
equivalent. We also prove, in section V, that two encryption
schemes introduced by Ambainis and Smith [8] and by Dodis
and Smith [3] (and generalized to the quantum world by
Desrosiers [4]) are still secure using this new definition and
require the same amount of key as in the limited quantum
model of [4]. Finally, in section VI, we generalize a proof of
Dodis and Smith to show that an entropic scheme that can
encrypt any n-qubit state having a conditional min-entropy of
at least t requires at least n− t− 1 bits of uniform key.
II. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES
A quantum state ρ is defined as a positive semidefinite operator
of trace equal to 1 over some Hilbert space H . By the spectral
decomposition theorem, ρ =
∑
i γi|ri〉〈ri|, where the |ri〉
form a basis for the space in which the quantum state lives and
the γi are non-negative real numbers that sum up to one. This
can be interpreted this way: if ρ is measured in the basis {|ri〉},
then it behaves as a source that will output with probability
γi the state |ri〉.1
The partial trace can be seen as a kind of inverse to the
tensor product operation. For any bipartite state ρAB , we have
that ρB = TrA
(
ρAB
)
; the normal interpretation for such an
operator is that if a physical state ρAB lives in the space AB
but one only has access to the system B to measure the state,
then the statistics obtained are in agreement with ρB . The
partial trace can be defined as:
TrA (ρ
AB) ,
∑
i
(〈ri|A ⊗ IB)ρAB(|ri〉A ⊗ IB) (1)
where the vectors {|ri〉} form any orthonormal basis for the
subspace A. In fact, this is equivalent to doing a complete
measurement of the A subsystem followed by a loss of the
1For a thorough introduction to quantum information theory, see [10]
result and of the A subsystem; what is left in our hands is
TrA(ρ
AB).
Throughout this paper, we will use superscripts for density
matrices to indicate on which subsystems they are defined;
for example, ρAB is a density operator on the Hilbert space
HA ⊗HB . By convention, when we omit certain subsystems
from the superscript, we mean that we take the partial trace
over the subsystems that are absent; i.e. ρB = TrA ρAB . We
will refer to the dimension of the Hilbert space HA by dA.
We will use as our main distance measure the trace distance
which is defined as
‖ρ− σ‖1 , Tr (|ρ− σ|) , (2)
where |A| is defined as
√
A†A, which is simply∑
i |αi| |ai〉〈ai| for a Hermitian operator A =
∑
i αi|ai〉〈ai|.
As [11] and chapter 9 in [10] tell us, for any two states ρ
and σ there exists an optimal adversary which can distinguish
between them with probability 12 +
1
4‖ρ− σ‖1; no adversary
can do better.
Another useful distance measure is known as the fidelity: given
two density operators ρ and σ, their fidelity F (ρ, σ) is defined
as
∥∥√ρ√σ∥∥
1
. If σ is a pure state |ψ〉〈ψ|, this is equal to√
〈ψ|ρ|ψ〉.
We will also frequently make use of operator inequalities:
given two Hermitian operators A and B, we will say that
A > B iff A−B is positive semidefinite.
Also, we denote by a‖b the concatenation of the bit strings
a and b. Xa, where a = a1 · · ·an is an n-bit string, means
Xa = Xa1 ⊗Xa2 ⊗ · · ·⊗Xan . We shall also write L(H) for
the space of linear operators on the Hilbert space H. Finally,
we denote by a⊙ b the inner product modulo 2 of the strings
a and b:
∑
i aibi mod 2.
III. MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
Entropic security as introduced by Russell and Wang [2] and
generalized by Dodis and Smith [3] uses the definition of
classical min-entropy to represent the adversary’s knowledge
on the sender’s message space. Let M be a random variable
over the message space M and let M take value m with
probability pm. Then the min-entropy of M , written H∞(M)
is defined to be − logmaxm(pm).
Desrosiers introduced in [4] a quantum version of these
security definitions for the case where the eavesdropper and the
sender are neither entangled nor correlated. In this setting, a
message σi is chosen at random with probability pi in a valid
interpretation {(pi, σi)} of a state ρA =
∑
i piσi. Here the
adversary’s a priori uncertainty is quantified by the quantum
min-entropy, H∞(ρA) = − logmaxj γj where
∑
γj |j〉〈j|
is the spectral decomposition of ρA. The joint system of
the sender and the adversary was considered to contain no
correlations: i.e. ρAE = σA ⊗ τE , where E represents the
eavesdropper’s system.
3In this paper, we shall show that we can fully generalize
these security definitions to the quantum setting, where no
assumption on the entanglement between the sender and the
adversary is made. The only restriction on the adversary
will be quantified by the following definition introduced by
Renner (see [5]) in his proof that the BB84 scheme, the
original quantum key distribution protocol, is secure in the
most general setting. We shall make no other assumption
on the sender-eavesdropper system than the eavesdropper’s
conditional min-entropy.
Definition 1 (Quantum conditional min-entropy). For any
quantum state ρAE shared between the eavesdropper and the
sender, we define the conditional min-entropy of A given E
as
H∞(A|E)ρ = − logmin
σE
min
{
λ : λIA ⊗ σE > ρAE}
where σE ranges over all normalized density operators over
HE .
According to [12], we can express the quantum conditional
min-entropy as
2−H∞(A|E)ρ = dAmaxE
〈Φ|E(ρAE)|Φ〉
where the maximization is taken over all CPTP maps E :
L(HE)→ L(HA′) and where HA′ ∼= HA.
One can prove a few properties about conditional min-entropy
which will be handy later on. First, this lemma:
Lemma 1. Let the joint state of the sender and the adversary
be ρAE = ρA ⊗ ρE , then H∞(A|E)ρ = H∞(A)ρ.
Proof:
2−H∞(A|E)ρ = min
σE
min
{
λ : λIA ⊗ σE > ρA ⊗ ρE}
> min
{
λ : λIA > ρA
}
= min
{
λ : λIA ⊗ ρE > ρA ⊗ ρE}
> min
σE
min
{
λ : λIA ⊗ σE > ρA ⊗ ρE} .
Since the first and last lines are the same, the two in-
equalities are, in fact, equalities, and hence 2−H∞(A|E)ρ =
min
{
λ : λIA > ρA
}
= 2−H∞(A)ρ .
We can conclude from this lemma that if the sender and the
adversary are not correlated, then the earlier results of [4] can
be used.
Furthermore, Ko¨nig, Renner and Schaffner [12] show that for
a state of the form ρAE =
∑
i pi|i〉〈i|A ⊗ ρEi (i.e. A holds
classical information and E holds a quantum state containing
partial information on A), the quantum conditional min-
entropy H∞(A|E)ρ characterizes Eve’s optimal probability of
guessing A by measuring E:
pguess = 2
−H∞(A|E)ρ
Note also that if the A and E systems are in a maximally
entangled state
∑d
i=1
1√
d
|i〉A|i〉E , where n = log d, then
H∞(A|E)ρ = −n. (3)
Hence, the quantum conditional min-entropy ranges from −n
to n for an n-qubits system and, as is the case with the
von Neumann conditional entropy, negative values arise from
purely quantum effects.
In our model, we will consider a protocol to be secure if
the adversary is incapable of obtaining classical information
about the message encoded in any basis. We will therefore
model the adversary as a POVM on the encrypted message
together with the adversary’s side information. Since entropic
security, even in the classical case (see [3]), does not have
good composability properties (i.e. the security of the scheme
does not necessarily imply that it can be securely embedded
in a larger cryptographic protocol), we will not consider
adversaries that keep quantum information without measuring
it in the hopes of mounting a more effective attack later after
having received more information. We are interested in the
predictive capabilities of an adversary that was given E(σi) —
see below for the formal definition of a cipher E — compared
to those of an adversary that was not given such a state in
predicting a function of i. Since our adversary is a POVM,
we take its output to be a prediction of the function f . We
shall denote the random variable that is the output of A on
any given state γ by A(γ); that is, if {Ai}i∈I is the set of
POVM elements associated with A, then A(γ) is a random
variable which takes the value i with probability Tr[Aiγ].
An encryption scheme E is a set of superoperators {Ek}
indexed by a uniformly distributed key k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} such
that for each k there exists an inverting operator Dk such that
for all ρAE , with probability one we have
(Dk ⊗ I)((Ek ⊗ I)(ρ)) = ρ. (4)
The view of the adversary is then (E ⊗ I)(ρAE) ,
1
K
∑K
k=1(Ek⊗I)(ρAE). To simplify the notation, we will write
E(ρAE) instead of (E ⊗ I)(ρAE) from now on. Note that in
general, E maps systems on space AE to systems on space
A′E; the dimension of A′ could be larger than the dimension
of A.
Both [3] and [4] presented security definitions equivalent in
their respective models to the following two security defini-
tions.
Note that throughout this paper, we shall be mostly concerned
with encryption schemes where the message to be sent consists
of n qubits; therefore n = log dA from now on.
Definition 2 (Entropic Security). An encryption system E
is (t, ε)-entropically secure if for all states ρAE such that
H∞(ρAE |ρE) > t, all interpretations {(pi, σAEi )}, all ad-
versaries A and all functions f , there exists an A′ such that
4we have: 2∣∣Pr[A(E(σAEi )) = f(i)]− Pr[A′(σEi ) = f(i)]∣∣ 6 ε. (5)
Note that everywhere, we take probabilities over all i and all
randomness used by the adversaries and the cipher.
Definition 3 (Entropic Indistinguishability). An encryption
system E is (t, ε)-indistinguishable if there exists a state ΩA′
such that for all states ρAE such that H∞(A|E)ρ > t we have
that: ∥∥∥E(ρAE)− ΩA′ ⊗ ρE∥∥∥
1
< ε. (6)
IV. EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN THE TWO SECURITY
DEFINITIONS
This section will show that an encryption scheme which is
entropically secure is entropically indistinguishable, and vice-
versa, up to small variations in the t and ε parameters. Before
presenting these proofs, however, we will need an additional
definition and a technical lemma. The following variation on
entropic security will prove to be useful in the sequel:
Definition 4 (Strong entropic security). An encryption system
E is strongly (t, ε)-entropically secure if for all states ρAE
such that H∞(ρAE |ρE) > t, all interpretations {(pi, σAEi )},
all adversaries A, and all functions f , we have∣∣Pr[A(E(σAEi ))=f(i)]−Pr[A(E(ρA)⊗ σEi )=f(i)]∣∣6ε. (7)
Note that in this case both uses of E are independent. Strong
(t, ε)-entropic security clearly implies regular (t, ε)-entropic
security, since A used on σEi and an encrypted message
independent of σEi (which can be prepared by Eve in her lab)
is a valid choice for A′.
The following lemma says that one does not need to consider
all possible functions, but one can restrict the analysis to
predicates:
Lemma 2. Let ρAE be a state, {(pi, σAEi )} be an interpre-
tation, E be a cipher, f be a function and A be an adversary
such that∣∣Pr[A(E(σAEi ))=f(i)]−Pr[A(E(ρA)⊗ σEi )=f(i)]∣∣>ε.
then there exist an adversary B and a predicate h such that∣∣Pr[B(E(σAEi ))=h(i)]−Pr[B(E(ρA)⊗ σEi )=h(i)]∣∣> ε2 .
Proof: Let our predicate be a Goldreich-Levin predicate
[13], that is hr(x) = r⊙f(x). Let p = Pr[A(E(σAEi )) = f(i)]
and q = Pr[A(E(ρA) ⊗ σEi ) = f(i)]. Then we know that
|p− q| > ε. Let us compute
E =
∣∣∣Er[Pr[r ⊙ A(E(σi)) =hr(i)]
−Pr[r ⊙ A(E(ρA)⊗ σEi ) = hr(i)]
]∣∣∣, (8)
2One can also get an equivalent definition by using functions on the states
σAE
i
rather than on the indices i.
where the expectation is taken over all r of adequate size. We
need two observations. First, when A predicts correctly, then
p = Pr[r ⊙ A(E(σAEi )) = hr(i)]. Second, when A does not
predict correctly, the probability that r⊙A(E(σi)) = hr(i) is
exactly one half. Hence Equation (8) reduces to
E =
∣∣∣∣1 · p+ 12 · (1− p)−
(
1 · q + 1
2
· (1− q)
)∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣p− q2
∣∣∣∣ > ε2 .
(9)
Thus there exists at least one value r such that the following
is true:∣∣Pr[r ⊙ A(E(σAEi ))=hr(i)]
−Pr[r ⊙ A(E(ρA)⊗ σEi )=hr(i)]
∣∣> ε
2
.
The lemma is proven if adversary B(·) is defined, using this
appropriate r, as r ⊙ A(·).
Theorem 1. (t− 1, ε/2)-entropic indistinguishability implies
strong (t, ε)-entropic security for all functions.
Proof: We shall prove the contrapositive. Suppose there
exists an adversary B, a state ρAE such that H∞(A|E)ρ > t,
an interpretation
{
(pj , σ
AE
j )
}
for ρAE and a function f such
that∣∣Pr[B(E(σAEi ))=f(i)]−Pr[B(E(ρA)⊗ σEi )=f(i)]∣∣>ε.
(10)
Then we know from Lemma 2 that there exists another
adversary and a predicate h such that strong (t, ε/2)-entropic
security is violated. Let’s call this adversary A and let us define
the sets E0 and E1 as follows:
E0 = {i|h(i) = 0} (11)
E1 = {i|h(i) = 1} . (12)
Define the following:
r0 =
∑
i∈E0
pi,
r1 =
∑
i∈E1
pi,
τAE0 =
1
r0
(∑
i∈E0
piσ
AE
i
)
τAE1 =
1
r1
(∑
i∈E1
piσ
AE
i
)
.
Note that ρAE = r0τAE0 + r1τAE1 . Now, define the following
states:
τ˜AE0 = r0τ
AE
0 + r1ρ
A ⊗ τE1 (13)
τ˜AE1 = r1τ
AE
1 + r0ρ
A ⊗ τE0 , (14)
where, as usual, τEi = TrA[τAEi ]. We need the following
lemma to finish the proof.
Lemma 3. Assuming H∞(A|E)ρ > t, we then have that both
H∞(A|E)τ˜0 and H∞(A|E)τ˜1 are at least t− 1.
5Proof: We have that
dAmaxE
〈Φ|E(τ˜AE0 )|Φ〉
6 r0dAmaxE
〈Φ|E(τAE0 )|Φ〉+ r1dAmaxE 〈Φ|ρ
A ⊗ E(τE1 )|Φ〉
6 dAmaxE
〈Φ|E(ρAE)|Φ〉+ dAmaxE 〈Φ|ρ
A ⊗ E(ρE)|Φ〉
6 2−t + dAmaxE
〈Φ|ρA ⊗ E(ρE)|Φ〉
(15)
We now bound the second term using the original definition
of the conditional min-entropy:
min
σE
min
{
λ : λIA ⊗ σE > ρA ⊗ ρE}
6 min
{
λ : λIA ⊗ ρE > ρA ⊗ ρE}
= min
{
λ : λIA > ρA
}
6 min
σE
min
{
λ : λIA ⊗ σE > ρAE}
6 2−t
(16)
Substituting this into the last line of (15) yields H∞(A|E)τ˜0 >
t−1. Of course, an identical calculation yields the same result
for τ˜AE1 .
To finish the proof of Theorem 1 , we want to show that A
can distinguish E(τ˜AE0 ) from E(τ˜AE1 ) with probability strictly
better than 1/2 + ε/4. Let’s denote by η the probability
that A will correctly distinguish E(τAE0 ) from E(τAE1 ) in an
r0, r1 mixture, and by α the probability that A will correctly
distinguish E(ρA)⊗τE0 from E(ρA)⊗τE1 in an r0, r1 mixture.
Also assume without loss of generality that η > α (otherwise
consider an adversary identical to A but which returns the
opposite answer). Now assume that we feed it E(τ˜AE0 ) with
probability 1/2 and E(τ˜AE1 ) with probability 1/2. Observe that
this is exactly as if we gave it an r0, r1 mixture of E(τAE0 )
and E(τAE1 ) with probability 1/2 and an r0, r1 mixture of
E(ρA) ⊗ τE0 and E(ρA) ⊗ τE1 with probability 1/2. We
then have that the probability of distinguishing E(τ˜AE0 ) from
E(τ˜AE1 ) using A is
1
2
η +
1
2
(1− α) = 1
2
+
1
2
(η − α)
since the correct answer is reversed for E(ρA) ⊗ τE0 and
E(ρA)⊗ τE1 .
But by the assumption that A violates entropic security, we
know that
η − α = Pr[A(E(τAEi ))= i]− Pr
[
A
(E(ρA)⊗ τEi )= i]
> ε/2.
Hence, the probability of distinguishing E(τ˜AE0 ) from E(τ˜AE1 )
is at least 1/2+ ε/4, which implies that for all ΩA′ we have:
ε <
∥∥E(τ˜AE0 )− E(τ˜AE1 )∥∥1
=
∥∥∥(E(τ˜AE0 )−ΩA′⊗ ρE)−(E(τ˜AE1 )−ΩA′⊗ ρE)∥∥∥
1
6
∥∥∥E(τ˜AE0 )− ΩA′⊗ ρE∥∥∥
1
+
∥∥∥E(τ˜AE1 )− ΩA′⊗ ρE∥∥∥
1
and therefore either
∥∥∥E(τ˜AE0 )− ΩA′⊗ ρE∥∥∥
1
> ε/2 or∥∥∥E(τ˜AE1 )− ΩA′⊗ ρE∥∥∥
1
> ε/2, which is a violation of
(t− 1, ε/2)-indistinguishability.
Theorem 2. (t, ε)-entropic security implies (t − 1, 6ε)-
indistinguishability as long as t 6 n− 1.
Proof: We will prove the contrapositive. Let E(I/dA) =
ΩA
′
and let ρAE be a state such that H∞(A|E)ρ > t− 1 and∥∥∥E(ρAE)− ΩA′ ⊗ ρE∥∥∥
1
> 6ε. Consider the following state
ρ̂AE =
1
3
ρAE +
2
3
I
dA
⊗ ρE .
.
We show that H∞(A|E)ρ̂ > t:
dAmaxE
〈Φ|E(ρ̂AE)|Φ〉
6
1
3
dAmaxE
〈Φ|E(ρAE)|Φ〉+ 2
3
dAmaxE
〈Φ|
(
I
A
2n
⊗ E(ρE)
)
|Φ〉
6
1
3
2−(t−1) +
2
3
dA〈Φ|
(
I
AE
2n
)
|Φ〉
6
1
3
2−(t−1) +
2
3
· 1
2n
=
2
3
(
2−t +
1
2n
)
6
2
3
(
2−t +
2−t
2
)
= 2−t.
Since
∥∥∥E(ρAE)− ΩA′⊗ ρE∥∥∥
1
> 6ε, we know that there exists
an adversary that can distinguish E(ρAE) from ΩA′⊗ρE with
probability at least 12 +
3
2ε. Let’s call this adversary A, and
let’s assume that it gives the right answer with probability η1
when it is given E(ρAE) and with probability η2 when it is
given ΩA′ ⊗ ρE . We then have 12 (η1 + η2) > 12 + 32ε.
Now, consider the following interpretation of ρ̂AE :
ρ̂AE =
1
3
σAE1 +
1
3
σAE2 +
1
3
σAE3 (17)
where σAE1 = ρAE and σAE2 = σAE3 = IdA ⊗ ρE . We
shall show that A violates entropic security for ρ̂AE , with this
interpretation and the function h(i) = i.
First of all, it is clear that by having access only to Eve’s sys-
tem, no adversary can guess the value of h with a probability
greater than 1/3. Let us now determine what A can do by
having access to the encrypted version of ρ̂AE . One possible
strategy for A is to try to distinguish between E(ρAE) and
ΩA
′⊗ ρE and return 1 when it gets E(ρAE) and randomly
6return either 2 or 3 when it gets ΩA′⊗ ρE . We then have:
Pr[A(E(σAEi )) = h(i)] =
1
3
η1 +
2
3
η2
2
=
1
3
(η1 + η2)
>
1
3
(1 + 3ε)
=
1
3
+ ε.
Finally we get that for all adversaries A′,∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Pr[A(E(σAEi ))=h(i)]−Pr[A′(σEi )=h(i)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1
3
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣>ε
a violation of entropic security.
V. TWO ENCRYPTION SCHEMES
Before presenting the ciphers, we will give some definitions
and technical lemmas which will be used in the presentation
of both encryption schemes.
First, we define the following shortcut for any matrix σAE :
Mσuv := TrA
[(
ZvXu√
dA
⊗ I
)
σAE
]
. (18)
We also define
ρ˜AE := ρAE − I
dA
⊗ ρE . (19)
for any state ρAE , where σE is a state such that ρAE 6
2−H∞(A|E)ρIA ⊗ σE .
Lemma 4. For every density matrix σAE , we have that σAE =∑
uv
XuZv√
dA
⊗Mσuv.
Proof: Let {Ej} be an orthonormal basis for L(HE).
Since Pauli matrices form an orthonormal basis for L(HA),
we have
σAE =
∑
uvj
XuZv√
dA
⊗ Ej Tr
[(
ZvXu√
dA
⊗ E†j
)
σAE
]
(20)
=
∑
uvj
XuZv√
dA
⊗ Ej Tr
[
E†jM
σ
uv
]
(21)
=
∑
uv
XuZv√
dA
⊗
∑
j
Ej Tr
[
E†jM
σ
uv
] (22)
=
∑
uv
XuZv√
dA
⊗Mσuv. (23)
We will also make use of the following lemma (Lemma 5.1.3
in [5]):
Lemma 5. Let S be a Hermitian operator and let σ be any
positive definite operator. Then
‖S‖1 6
√
Tr (σ)Tr
(
Sσ−1/2Sσ−1/2
)
.
A. A scheme based on δ-biased sets
In [8], Ambainis and Smith introduced an approximate quan-
tum encryption scheme based on δ-biased sets. Here, we shall
show that if H∞(A|E)ρ > t, then the Ambainis-Smith scheme
is (t, ε)-secure using n − t + 2 logn + 2 log(1ε ) bits of key,
where n is the logarithm of dA as usual.
Definition 5 (δ-biased set). A set S ⊆ {0, 1}n is said to be
δ-biased if and only if for every s′ ∈ {0, 1}n, s′ 6= 0n, we
have that
∣∣∣ 1|S|∑s∈S(−1)s⊙s′ ∣∣∣ 6 δ.
There exist several efficient constructions of δ-biased sets (
[14]–[16]); following [3], we will use the one from [16], which
yields sets of size n2/δ2 (note that Dickinson and Nayak [17]
improve this to 6 16/δ2).
The Ambainis-Smith scheme consists of applying an operator
at random from the set{
XaZb : a‖b ∈ S and |a| = |b| = n}
where S is a δ-biased set containing strings of length 2n. The
shared private key is used to index one of the operators. In
other words, the encryption operator is
E(ρAE) = 1|S|
∑
a‖b∈S
(XaZb ⊗ I)ρAE(ZbXa ⊗ I)
We shall now prove that this scheme is secure in our frame-
work. The following lemma contains most of the proof, and
the main theorem follows:
Lemma 6. For any state ρAE with H∞(A|E)ρ > t, we have
that ∥∥∥∥E(ρAE)− IdA ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
6 δ
√
dA2−t (24)
Proof: Let σE be a state such that ρAE 6 2−tIA ⊗ σE
and write∥∥∥∥E(ρAE)− IdA ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
6
√
dA Tr
[
E(ρ˜AE)(I⊗ σE−
1
2 )E(ρ˜AE)(I⊗ σE−
1
2 )
]
(25)
This is due to Lemma 5, with σ = I ⊗ σE ; without loss of
generality, we can assume that ρE has full rank by considering
HE to be the support of ρE . We continue by applying Lemma
4 on ρ˜AE :
ρ˜AE =
∑
uv
XuZv√
dA
⊗M ρ˜uv (26)
and therefore
E(ρ˜AE) =
∑
uv
E
(
XuZv√
dA
)
⊗M ρ˜uv (27)
=
∑
uv
αuv
XuZv√
dA
⊗M ρ˜uv (28)
7where αuv = 1|S|
∑
a‖b∈S(−1)v‖u⊙a‖b, and since Tr[ρ˜AE ] =
0, we can neglect the term v‖u = 02n, and hence |αuv| 6 δ.
We now compute the trace in (25) as follows:
Tr
[
E(ρ˜AE)(I⊗ σE−
1
2 )E(ρ˜AE)(I⊗ σE−
1
2 )
]
= Tr
[(∑
uv
αuv
XuZv√
dA
⊗M ρ˜uv
)
(∑
uv
αuv
XuZv√
dA
⊗ σE−
1
2M ρ˜uvσ
E−
1
2
)]
(a)
= Tr
[(∑
uv
αuv
XuZv√
dA
⊗M ρ˜uv
)
(∑
uv
αuv
ZvXu√
dA
⊗ σE−
1
2M ρ˜uv
†
σE
− 12
)]
(b)
= Tr
[∑
uv
α2uv
I
A
dA
⊗M ρ˜uvσE
−12M ρ˜uv
†
σE
− 12
]
(c)
6 δ2Tr
[∑
uv
I
A
dA
⊗M ρ˜uvσE
− 12M ρ˜uv
†
σE
− 12
]
(d)
6 δ2Tr
[∑
uv
I
A
dA
⊗MρuvσE
− 12Mρuv
†σE
− 12
]
= δ2Tr
[(∑
uv
XuZv√
dA
⊗Mρuv
)
(∑
uv
ZvXu√
dA
⊗ σE−
1
2Mρuv
†σE
− 12
)]
(e)
= δ2Tr
[
ρAE
(
(I⊗ σE−
1
2 )ρAE(I⊗ σE−
1
2 )
)†]
= δ2Tr
[
ρAE(I⊗ σE−
1
2 )ρAE(I⊗ σE−
1
2 )
]
(f)
6 δ2Tr
[
ρAE2−tIAE
]
= δ22−t
(29)
where
• (a) comes from the fact that (I ⊗ σE−
1
2 )E(ρ˜AE)(I ⊗
σE
− 12 ) is Hermitian, hence taking its adjoint leaves it
unchanged;
• (b) is true because terms in which the u, v pairs are not
the same in both sums disappear when we take the trace;
• (c) because α2uv > δ2 and every term in the sum has
a nonnegative trace since Tr[M ρ˜uvσE
−12M ρ˜uv
†
σE
− 12 ] =
Tr[(σ−
1
4M ρ˜uvσ
− 14 )(σ−
1
4M ρ˜uvσ
− 14 )†].
• (d) is justified below;
• (e) is due to Lemma 4; and
• (f) comes from the fact that ρAE 6 2−tI⊗ σE ⇒ (I ⊗
σE
− 12 )ρAE(I⊗ σE−
1
2 ) 6 2−tIAE .
To justify (d), we first observe that Mρuv =M ρ˜uv+M τuv, where
τ = IdA ⊗ ρE . Hence,
Tr
[∑
uv
I
A
dA
⊗MρuvσE
− 12Mρuv
†σE
− 12
]
= Tr
[∑
uv
I
A
dA
⊗M ρ˜uvσE
− 12M ρ˜uv
†
σE
− 12
]
+Tr
[∑
uv
I
A
dA
⊗M ρ˜uvσE
− 12M τuv
†σE
− 12
]
+Tr
[∑
uv
I
A
dA
⊗M τuvσE
− 12M ρ˜uv
†
σE
− 12
]
+Tr
[∑
uv
I
A
dA
⊗M τuvσE
− 12M τuv
†σE
− 12
]
.
(30)
Step (d) then follows when we combine this with the obser-
vation that M τ00 = ρE , M τuv = 0 if uv 6= 00, and M ρ˜00 = 0:
the first sum is what we want to bound; the two sums in the
middle evaluate to the zero matrix; and in the last sum, only
the 00 term remains, which clearly has a positive trace.
Substituting the end result of (29) in (25), we obtain:∥∥∥∥E(ρAE)− IdA ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
6 δ
√
dA2−t. (31)
The main theorem now easily follows:
Theorem 3. If H∞(A|E)ρ > t, then the Ambainis-Smith
scheme is (t, ε)-secure using n − t + 2 logn + 2 log(1ε ) + 2
bits of key, where n = log dA.
Proof: If we choose δ = ε/2(n−t)/2 and construct S using
the method of [16] such that |S| = (2n)2/δ2, by Lemma 6
we obtain
∥∥∥E(ρAE)− IdA ⊗ ρE∥∥∥1 6 ε using n− t+2 logn+
2 log(1ε ) + 2 bits of key.
B. A scheme based on XOR-universal functions
Our second scheme based on XOR-universal functions can be
considered as a quantum version of the scheme given in [3].
This scheme can also be viewed as a generalization of the
second scheme of [8].
Definition 6. Let Hn = {hi}i∈I be a finite family of functions
from n-bit strings to n-bit strings. We say the family Hn is
strongly-XOR-universal if for all n-bit strings a, x, and y such
that x 6= y we have
Pri[hi(x)⊕ hi(y) = a] = 1
2n
.
where i is distributed uniformly over I . The family proposed
in [3] naturally possesses this property if one allows i to be
zero.
8We define our second cipher as follows. Let H2n be a strongly-
XOR-universal family of functions. The encryption operator
for the key k is defined as
Ek(ρ) = 1|I|
∑
i∈I
|i〉〈i|A′ ⊗ (XaZb ⊗ IE)ρAE(ZbXa ⊗ IE)
(32)
where a‖b = hi(k), |a| = |b| = n, hi ∈ H2n and k is the secret
key selected uniformly at random from a set K ⊆ {0, 1}2n.
The overall cipher can be described by the superoperator
E(ρ) = 1|I||K|
∑
i∈I,k∈K
|i〉〈i|A′⊗(XaZb⊗IE)ρAE(ZbXa⊗IE).
(33)
The structure of K is irrelevant; only its cardinality matters
for the security of the scheme. Not that this scheme is not
length preserving since the ancillary system A′ is part of the
ciphertext. We now prove that this scheme is secure with the
following theorem:
Theorem 4. E is (t, ε)-indistinguishable if log |K| > n− t+
2 log(1/ε).
Proof: To show that the cipher is (t, ε)-indistinguishable,
we must show that for all states ρAE such that H∞(A|E)ρ >
t, ∥∥∥∥∥E(ρAE)− IAA
′
|I|dA ⊗ ρ
E
∥∥∥∥∥
1
6 ε. (34)
As in the proof of our other scheme, we use Lemma 5 with
σ = IAA
′ ⊗ ρE to bound this:
∥∥∥∥∥E(ρAE)− IAA
′
|I|dA ⊗ ρ
E
∥∥∥∥∥
1
6
√
|I|dA Tr
[
E(ρ˜AE)(I ⊗ σE−
1
2 )E(ρ˜AE)(I⊗ σE−
1
2 )
]
.
(35)
To compute the trace in the above expression, we first express
E(ρ˜AE) using Lemma 4:
E(ρ˜AE) =
∑
uv
E
(
XuZv√
dA
)
⊗M ρ˜uv (36)
=
∑
uvki
αuvki|i〉〈i| ⊗ X
uZv√
dA
⊗M ρ˜uv (37)
where αuvki = 1|I||K|(−1)v‖u⊙a‖b where a‖b = hi(k).
We are now ready to evaluate the trace in (35):
Tr
[
E(ρ˜AE)(I⊗ σE−
1
2 )E(ρ˜AE)(I⊗ σE−
1
2 )
]
= Tr
[(∑
uvki
αuvki|i〉〈i| ⊗ X
uZv√
dA
⊗M ρ˜uv
)
(∑
uvki
αuvki|i〉〈i| ⊗ X
uZv√
dA
⊗ σE−
1
2M ρ˜uvσ
E−
1
2
)]
(a)
= Tr
[(∑
uvki
αuvki|i〉〈i| ⊗ X
uZv√
dA
⊗M ρ˜uv
)
(∑
uvki
αuvki|i〉〈i| ⊗ Z
vXu√
dA
⊗ σE−
1
2M ρ˜uv
†
σE
− 12
)]
(b)
= Tr
[ ∑
uvkk′i
αuvkiαuvk′i
I
A
dA
⊗M ρ˜uvσE
− 12M ρ˜uv
†
σE
−12
]
(c)
=
1
|I||K| Tr
[∑
uv
I
A
dA
⊗M ρ˜uvσE
− 12M ρ˜uv
†
σE
− 12
]
(d)
6
2−t
|I||K|
(38)
where
• (a) comes from the fact that (I ⊗ σE−
1
2 )E(ρ˜AE)(I ⊗
σE
− 12 ) is Hermitian, hence taking its adjoint leaves it
unchanged;
• (b) is true because terms in which the u, v, i triples are
not the same in both sums disappear when we take the
trace. Taking the partial trace on the subsystem containing
|i〉〈i| then yields this.
• (c) is justified below
• (d) follows exactly the same argument as in equation
block (29) from line (d) onwards.
We now justify step (c). We first consider the terms of the
sum in which k 6= k′. In the following, let a‖b = hi(k) and
c‖d = hi(k′). If k 6= k′, we have∑
i∈I
αuvkiαuvk′i
=
∑
i∈I
1
|I|2|K|2 (−1)
v‖u⊙a‖b(−1)v‖u⊙c‖d
=
∑
i∈I
1
|I|2|K|2 (−1)
(v‖u⊙a‖b)⊕(v‖u⊙c‖d)
=
∑
i∈I
1
|I|2|K|2 (−1)
v‖u⊙(a‖b⊕c‖d).
(39)
However, by Definition 6, a‖b⊕ c‖d is uniformly distributed
over all 2n-bit strings when i is chosen uniformly at random.
This sum is therefore equal to zero whenever u‖v 6= 02n,
and to 1|I||K|2 when u‖v = 02n. However, we observe that
M ρ˜00 = 0, and hence those terms also disappear from the sum
inside the trace.
To take care of the case where k = k′, it can easily be shown
that α2uvki = 1|I|2|K|2 . Summing over all i and k, step (c)
follows.
9Now, by hypothesis, we have log |K| > n − t + 2 log(1/ε),
which can be transformed into − log |K| − t 6 log(ε2) −
log dA. Exponentiating both sides yields 2
−t
|K| 6
ε2
dA
. Combin-
ing this bound with (38) and substituting in (35) concludes
the proof.
VI. MINIMUM REQUIREMENT FOR THE KEY LENGTH
We can generalize the proof for the lower bound on the key
length found in [3] to the quantum world and the conditional
min-entropy definition.
Theorem 5. Any quantum encryption scheme which is (t, ε)-
indistinguishable for inputs of n qubits requires a key of length
at least n− t− 1 as long as ε 6 1/2.
Proof: We prove this by constructing a state with condi-
tional min-entropy t which provably requires at least n− t−1
bits of key to be securely encrypted. Consider the state
ρAAˆE = |Φ+〉〈Φ+|AE ⊗ IAˆdAˆ where |Φ
+〉AE =∑dAi=1 |i〉A|i〉E
is a maximally entangled state; Alice wants to send both A
and Aˆ to Bob securely. Furthermore, let dA = dE = 2(n−t)/2
and dAˆ = 2(n+t)/2, hence dAAˆ = 2n. It is easy to compute
the conditional min-entropy of this state:
H∞(AAˆ|E)ρ = H∞(A|E)|Φ+〉〈Φ+| +H∞(Aˆ)IAˆ/dAˆ
= −(n− t)/2 + (n+ t)/2
= t.
Now, it is clear that this state requires at least as much key
to encrypt as |Φ+〉〈Φ+|AE alone, since one could securely
encrypt |Φ+〉〈Φ+|AE using a protocol to encrypt ρAAˆE by
adding (n + t)/2 random qubits to the input state. However,
as the following theorem proves, |Φ+〉〈Φ+|AE requires at least
(n− t)− 1 bits of key to encrypt.
Theorem 6. Let EA˜→A be a cipher such that for all states
ρA˜E , there exists some state ΩA such that∥∥∥(EA˜ ⊗ IE)(ρA˜E)− ΩA ⊗ ρE∥∥∥
1
6 ε, (40)
then E requires at least 2 log(dA˜) − 1 bits of key, or 2n − 1
bits of key for an n-qubit system, whenever ε 6 1/2.
Before proving this, we first need a technical lemma which
says that by conditioning on a classical system, we cannot
reduce the min-entropy by more than the dimension of the
system:
Lemma 7. Given a state ωAEK =
∑
k pkω
AE
k ⊗ωKk , we have
that H∞(E|AK)ω > H∞(E|A)ω − log |K|.
Proof:
2−H∞(E|AK) = min
σAE
min
{
λ : λIE ⊗ σAK > ωAEK}
6 min
σA
min
{
λ : λIE ⊗ σA ⊗ I
K
|K| > ω
AEK
}
= |K|min
σA
min
{
λ : λIEK ⊗ σA > ωAEK}
6 |K|min
σA
min
{
λ : λIE ⊗ σA > ωAE}
= |K|2−H∞(E|A)
where the second inequality holds due to the fact that
ωAE 6 λIE ⊗ σA
⇒ ωAE ⊗ IK 6 λIEK ⊗ σA
⇒ ωAEK 6 λIEK ⊗ σA.
The last implication is true since the classicality of K ensures
that ωAEK 6 ωAE ⊗ IK .
Proof of Theorem 6: Let HA˜ ∼= HE , and let ρA˜E =
|Φ+〉〈Φ+|A˜E . Then, by the Fuchs-van de Graaf inequalities
[18] 3, we have that
F
(
E(ρ),ΩA ⊗ I
E
2n
)2
> 1− ε (41)
Now, let ζAEK be a state such that TrK [ζAEK ] = E(ρ) and
in which the K register holds the key:
ζAEK =
1
|K|
∑
k
Ek(ρA˜E)⊗ |k〉〈k|K .
Then, by Uhlmann’s theorem ( [19], or see Theorem 9.4 in
[10]),
F
(
E(ρ),Ω⊗ I
2n
)2
= max
σ,TrK [σ]=Ω⊗ I2n
F
(
ζAEK , σAEK
)2
Now, let σAEK be a state such that TrK [σAEK ] = Ω⊗ I2n that
maximizes the above fidelity. Also, let ωAEKK′ = V σAEKV †
and ξAEKK′ = V ζAEKV †, where V K→KK′ =
∑
k |kk〉〈k|,
HK ∼= HK′ and {|k〉}k∈K is the computational basis on HK .
Note that this ensures that ωAEK is classical on K . We then
have:
F
(
E(ρ),Ω⊗ I
2n
)2
= F
(
ζAEK , σAEK
)2
= F
(
ξAEKK
′
, ωAEKK
′
)2
6 F
(
ξAEK , ωAEK
)2
6 F
(
ΦA˜E ,D(ωAEK)
)2
6 max
GAK→A˜
F
(
ΦA˜E ,G(ωAEK)
)2
=
2−H∞(E|AK)ω
2n
where DAK→A˜ is a superoperator which decrypts and then
forgets the key. Now, by Lemma 7 above, we have that for
3See also Equation 9.110 in Nielsen and Chuang
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any state ωAEK such that TrK [ωAEK ] = ΩA ⊗ IE2n that is
classical on K , H∞(E|AK)ω > n− log |K|. Hence,
1− ε 6 F
(
E(ρ),Ω⊗ I
2n
)2
(42)
6
2−n+log |K|
2n
(43)
= |K| · 2−2n (44)
and therefore |K| > 22n(1−ε). Hence, log |K| > 2n+log(1−
ε) > 2n− 1 if, as assumed, ε 6 12 .
The tighter bound of [3] for schemes using public coins, given
there as proposition 3.8, cannot be similarly generalized.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have shown how to fully generalize the notions of entropic
security and entropic indistinguishability without making any
assumption on the entanglement between the sender and the
adversary. Furthermore, we proved that the two approximate
quantum encryption scheme presented in [8] are also secure in
this model. Is it possible to prove a general theorem showing
that every quantum encryption scheme is entropically secure?
If it is true, it would require different techniques than the ones
used here, since our proofs rely on the fact that the ciphers
give guarantees in the 2-norm, and not only in the 1-norm as
in the definition of an approximate cipher. We leave this as an
open problem.
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